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Do Sympathy Biases Induce Charitable Giving? 




We randomize advertising content motivated by the psychology literature on sympathy 
generation and framing effects in mailings to about 185,000 prospective new donors in India. We 
find significant impact on the number of donors and amounts donated consistent with sympathy 
biases such as the “identifiable victim,” “in-group” and “reference dependence.”  A monthly 
reframing of the ask amount increases donors and amount donated relative to daily reframing. A 
second field experiment targeted to past donors, finds that the effect of sympathy bias on giving is 
smaller in percentage terms but statistically and economically highly significant in terms of the 
magnitude of additional dollars raised. Methodologically, the paper complements the work of 
behavioral scholars by adopting an empirical researchers’ lens of measuring relative effect sizes and 
economic relevance of multiple behavioral theoretical constructs in the sympathy bias and charity 
domain within one field setting. Beyond the benefit of conceptual replications, the effect sizes 
provide guidance to managers on which behavioral theories are most managerially and 
economically relevant when developing advertising content. 
  
Key Words: Charitable Giving, Sympathy Biases, Identified Victim Effect, Non-profit 
marketing, Advertising, Behavioral Economics, Conceptual Replications
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1  Introduction 
As charities face increasingly competitive fundraising environments, they have begun to 
employ marketing activities to encourage donations. This has led to an explosive growth of 
research in recent years on the “demand side” of charitable giving. These papers have focused on 
various dimensions of charitable giving appeals such as incentives, seed money and match rates 
(e.g., List and Lucking-Reily 2002, Karlan and List 2007), social comparison (e.g., Shang and 
Croson 2009) and social pressure (DellaVigna et al. 2012) on donor behavior. While there is a 
large volume of behavioral research in the laboratory on the how advertising content affects 
outcomes of interest, there is little field based empirical research in general on the effects of 
advertising content on consumer purchases in general and donation behavior in particular. Our 
goal in this paper is to document and quantify the relative magnitudes of various types of 
advertising appeals on donation behavior motivated by the psychology theories through large scale 
field experiments.  
Academic research by empirical scholars on advertising effects using field data typically focus 
on estimating the relationship between the volume, frequency and timing of advertising on market 
outcomes such as sales and market shares;1 but field research on how different elements of 
advertising content affects market outcomes is rare.2 Some exceptions include Bertrand et al. 
(2010), who vary advertising content in combination with interest rates and offer deadlines to 
study its impact on loan take-up in a direct mail field experiment in South Africa and Liaukonyte 
(2012) who codes the video content of TV ads for comparative and self-promotional advertising 
and studies the differential effect of demand for OTC analgesics in the US.  The paucity of 
research on advertising content effects is partly because unlike the data on the level of spend, 
frequency and timing which are easily quantifiable and amenable to empirical testing, content of 
1 See Kaul and Wittink (1995), Wind and Sharp (2009), Dellavigna and Gentzkow (2010) and Sethuraman et al. (2011) 
for reviews of the empirical evidence on advertising. 
2 Otherwise, research on advertising content has focused primarily on laboratory experiments. To be sure, advertising 
agencies and direct marketing firms routinely do copy testing before launching advertisements or sending mailers, but 
these studies are seldom designed to enable generalizable learning because they are built on context specific intuition; 
few results have been reported in the literature (e.g., Stone and Jacobs 2008). 
 
 
                                                   
 
 
ads vary on a large number of dimensions, and it is difficult to isolate dimensions of interest 
systematically from advertisements used in the field.  
Psychologists have found that emotions sometimes work better to motivate people to action 
than cognition; hence treatments that generate an emotional response can be more effective in 
generating donations. Sympathy is the particular emotional response triggered by another person’s 
misfortune; laboratory experiments consistently show that evoking sympathy leads to prosocial 
behavior and charitable giving (e.g., Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Batson et al. 1997; Coke, Batson, 
and McDavis 1978).  
Researchers have demonstrated framing effects called “sympathy biases” that can generate 
disproportionately greater sympathy relative to the actual needs of the victims. We believe this 
should translate to greater giving. Hence we consider three such sympathy biases to generate three 
advertising content treatments in our experiment. They are: (1) the identified victim effect (2) the 
in-group effect, (3) reference dependent sympathy effect. Sympathy can be increased by reducing 
the perceived social distance from the victim (Small 2011). The identified victim effect reduces the 
perceived social distance between donor and the victim by identifying an individual victim to a 
potential donor; while the in-group effect reduces social social distance as the victim is from the 
same in-group as the target donor. The reference dependent sympathy effect arises because 
sympathy is greater if one framed a victim’s current condition as a decline from a reference 
condition, rather than simply presenting the actual condition. (Small 2010).  
Our fourth experimental treatment for advertising content involves a temporal reframing of 
the donation. Charities often reframe an aggregate annual donation into smaller monthly or daily 
amount, even though the donation itself is annual. For example, a $365 donation can be made to 
appear more affordable by reframing it as $1 a day or $30 a month. Such strategies are used also 
in other marketing contexts, ranging from insurance, magazine subscriptions, durable goods and 
charitable donations. Gourville (1998) dubbed such temporal reframing into a small daily amount 
as “a pennies a day” (PAD) strategy. However, the pennies a day framing violates an alternative 





larger amount (e.g., Thaler 1985). Thus far, there has been little research on the bounds of the 
PAD strategy and whether alternative temporal framing could lead to superior outcomes. We 
therefore compare donations from monthly and daily reframing.  
We test these hypotheses using two field experiments in an entirely natural setting in 
partnership with HelpAge India, one of India’s leading charities in the aid of seniors. In the first 
and primary experiment, we tagged on to an annual new donor acquisition campaign, where the 
organization sends out mailers to a cold list of around 200,000 high net worth individuals all over 
India. We added an additional flyer to the regular ask used in this campaign. This flyer 
randomized the contents of the ask message in line with the hypotheses we sought to test. The 
magnitude of donations solicited and obtained is significant relative to incomes in India.3 We find 
economically large and statistically significant effects on both the intensive and extensive margin 
for the various sympathy generation and framing effects that we tested. For the various effects we 
test, the number of donations per mailer increases by 43%-155%, while donation amount per 
mailer increases by 33%-110%.  
It is likely that the impact of framing on sympathy and donation is very high for a cold list of 
donors, because their baseline level of sympathy for the cause is likely lower. Would such effects of 
framing vanish among past donors, where baseline sympathy level for the cause is already high? 
To test this, our second experiment targeted a warm list of about 100,000 donors, who have 
previously donated to HelpAge. As HelpAge was reluctant to conduct the full battery of 
treatments, many of which had been shown to be ineffective in the first experiment, we only 
experimented with a few treatments to test our conjecture that the effect vanishes for past donors. 
As expected, the percentage impact on donations for our previously largest effect falls; the effect 
falls from 110% to 15%. However the effects remain both statistically and economically significant. 
In particular, since the baseline amount of donations from past donors is significantly higher, even 
3 According to the mail list provider, the average annual income of the households in the mailed list is about ₹600,000 
(about $10,000). The donation requested is ₹9000, about 1.5% of the annual income. The median amount donated is 
₹3,000, about 0.5% of the annual income. 
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the 15% increase due to the sympathy bias generates more in dollars than the 110% treatment 
effect on the cold list. We conclude that while framing effects of advertising content have much 
larger proportional impact in new donor acquisition, the economic impact in incremental absolute 
amounts is very significant among both new and existing donors.  
Methodologically, this paper is part of a small but growing empirical literature in marketing 
using field experiments to measure advertising effects (e.g., Eastlack and Rao 1989; Lodish et al. 
1995; and Sahni 2015). More broadly, this paper contributes to a research paradigm bridging 
empirical work in behavioral and quantitative marketing. Behavioral marketing scholars test and 
provide evidence for particular psychological theories in controlled laboratory settings. As the 
focus is often on isolating and understanding the mechanism underlying the  novel psychological 
theories, there is limited interest on whether these effects replicate in field settings and whether 
the magnitude of the effects are managerially important. Lynch et al. (2015) describe the value of 
conceptual replications and replications with extensions (moderators) in behavioral work in 
generating marketing knowledge. Further from a managerial perspective, there is value in knowing 
the relative magnitudes of the behavioral levers suggested by different theories, so that a firm can 
prioritize on which behavioral lever to use. Quantitative scholars routinely focus on relative 
elasticities of alternative marketing actions on an outcome of interest using field data to aid 
managers choose the most effective marketing actions. In a similar vein, this paper complements 
and builds on the behavioral literature to measure the relative magnitudes of alternative 
behavioral levers on outcomes of managerial interest—in this case donation behavior. 
The rest of the article organized as follows: Section 2 provides industry background and 
overviews of the literature. Section 3 describes the hypotheses, while Section 4 describes the 
experimental setting and treatments. Section 5 describes the results and Section 6 concludes. 






The advertising industry is a major sector in the world economy. In 2011, advertising 
spending was about $147 billion in the U.S. and $490 billion worldwide. These numbers are likely 
to rapidly grow as advertising is growing rapidly at double-digit rates in emerging markets such as 
China and India, and now accounts for a significant and growing fraction of the economy.4 Even 
though a large fraction of that cost is incurred on media spending to deliver the message, the 
effort and cost on the development of the advertising “creative” to maximize advertising 
effectiveness is substantial.5 The industry also spends considerable effort in evaluating and 
recognizing the effectiveness of creative advertising ideas through high profile annual awards such 
as the CLIO and Effie awards. 
Despite the recognition that advertising content and creativity are critical to advertising 
effectiveness, econometric research has mostly been about the link between advertising spending 
on sales (see reviews of the literature in Kaul and Wittink 1995; Chandy et al. 2001). There have 
also been studies in the direct marketing literature about how varying the number of 
advertisements or frequency of mailings impact consumer purchases (e.g., Anderson and Simester 
2004; Gonul and Shi 1998). This focus on spend, timing and frequency of advertising on sales in 
econometric modeling perhaps arises from the easy quantifiability of such variables. Liaukonyte 
(2012) is an exception in that she codes the video content of over 4000 TV advertisements to 
distinguish between comparative and self-promotional advertising and studies the impact on 
demand in the US OTC analgesics market. 
Research related to advertising content has generally been done by consumer psychologists 
who have shown systematic effects of advertising content on cognition, affect and purchase 
intentions in the laboratory. However there has been little effort on replicating these effects in field 
settings (Chandy et al. 2001); further, we do not know whether the effects are large enough to be 
4 China’s advertising spend in 2011 is estimated to be $54 billion and forecast to be $64 billion, an annual growth of 
16.9%. Overall, the Asia Pacific region had advertising spend of $175 billion with annual growth of 10.2%. See Group M 
report (http://www.aaaa.org/news/agency/Pages/120511_groupm_forecast.aspx). 
5 The industry had traditionally bundled its creative and media services and hence share of spend on creative is not 
available. (See Silk and Berndt 2003)  
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economically important.6 We note that many advertising agencies do test alternative advertising 
concepts for effectiveness in on-field testing but the insights from such concept tests are hard to 
generalize because they do not vary content systematically in a theoretically grounded manner.7 
Bertrand et al. (2010) test the effectiveness of a of number of non-informative advertising cues and 
prices on loan uptake from a credit card lender using a direct mailer based randomized field 
experiment. Our work is similar in its focus on understanding relative magnitudes of different 
advertising content effects. In terms of contrasts (apart from the obvious difference in empirical 
contexts), their focus is on testing the economic magnitudes of ad content relative to price effects, 
while we test the relative magnitudes of a set of well-recognized sympathy biases documented in 
the psychology literature to measure the relative economic importance of these theories for 
managers in inducing sympathy and charitable giving. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on field experiments in advertising. In a landmark 
set of field experiments, Eastlack and Rao (1989) report the effects of a number of treatments: 
marketing budgets, media type and mix, creative copy, and target audience on factory shipments 
of various products at the Campbell Soup Company. Lodish et al. (1995) report a meta-analysis of 
advertising experiments using split cable, where the only difference between the experimental and 
treatment group was on the TV advertisements they saw. Sahni (2015) use online field experiment 
to test for alternative mechanisms by which the temporal spacing of advertising impacts sales; 
while Bart et al. (2014) use field experiments to study for which types of products mobile display 
advertising favorably impacted attitudes and purchase intentions. 
 
B. Charitable Giving 
Charitable giving constitutes a significant portion of the GDP of countries. Americans gave 
more than $306 billion to charity in 2007, or approximately 2.2% of gross domestic product 
6 Levitt and List (2007) provide many reasons for why the laboratory findings need to be validated on the field. 
7 Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) recently study how matching advertising to web content and the level of obtrusiveness 
impact purchase intent through data from a large scale field experiment. 
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(AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy 2008). Despite the recession, Americans gave more than $290 
billion to charity in 2010, a growth of 3.8% from 2009 (AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy 2010). 
Individual giving accounted for 73% of this total, while foundations accounted for 14%, bequests 
for 8%, and corporations for 5%. Almost 70% of U.S. households report giving to charity. Even 
though the volume of giving is large, inter-charity competition for donations is substantial with 
over 800,000 charitable organizations in the United States alone. Increasingly, non-profit 
organizations are adopting marketing and targeted advertising techniques used by the for-profit 
sector to obtain funds for their causes. Watson (2006) estimated marketing spend at large U.S. 
non-profits at $7.6 billion based on IRS exemption data.  
Despite the larger need for charitable giving in developing countries, individual giving 
constitutes an insignificant share in these countries. For example, even though India’s giving 
totaled close to $5 billion in 2006 (about 0.6 percent of India’s GDP),8 individual and corporate 
donations constitute only 10% of charitable giving, with over 90% of the sector funded by 
government and foreign organizations. In fact, nearly 65 percent of the sector funds come from 
India’s central and state governments with a focus on disaster relief. Given the massive inequalities 
and the enormous needs of the poor and disadvantaged in emerging economies, the ability to 
understand the persuasive impact of communication to increase individual giving is of great social 
importance. 
Relative to research focused on demand for goods that improve one’s own welfare, there is 
limited research on “demand” for spending on others’ welfare (Bendapudi at al. 1996; Andreoni 
2006). The field of charitable giving in economics has recently seen a surge in the use of 
randomized field experiments (see List 2011 for a survey), but most studies are focused on price 
and incentive effects on charitable giving (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley 2002). In the context of 
blood donations, Lacetera et al. (2011) show that economic rewards increase blood donations and 
change their timing of donations; but they also find that a surprise reward for donations reduce 
8 Countries like Brazil and China have smaller non-profit sectors at 0.3 percent and 0.1 percent, but are growing. But 
this is cold comfort given the enormous needs of the poor and disadvantaged in India. 
7 
 
                                                   
 
 
future donations, relative to giving no reward. Academics have rarely used randomized field 
experiments to study the persuasive effects of advertising content in natural settings. Other 
behavioral work on charitable giving include: Soetevent (2005) and, who shows that revealing the 
identity of givers increasing donations suggesting social effects. Landry et al. (2006) find that 
lotteries increase giving, but surprisingly the attractiveness of the fund raiser is at least as 
important as the economic incentive in persuading people to give. Shang and Croson (2009) show 
that providing social comparisons of giving impact donation behavior. DellaVigna et al. (2012) 
test the role of altruism relative to social pressure in charitable giving.  
Research in laboratory settings have tested how the framing of asks impact fundraising (e.g., 
Ferraro et al. 2005; Gourville 1998). Fishbein’s (1967) behavioral intentions model has been 
frequently used to model donation behavior (see LaTour and Manrai 1989). Recently Small and 
colleagues (e.g., Small and Lowenstein 2003, 2005; Small 2010), among others have focused on 
developing psychological theories that inform how generation of sympathy for other people and 
worthy causes affect donation behavior. We leverage on these theories for our hypotheses.  
3  Hypotheses 
Our first four hypotheses are based on framing effects from the literature on sympathy biases 
and the fifth is based on temporal reframing of monthly versus daily ask for an annual donation. 
Of the four sympathy bias hypotheses, the first three are related to how social distance impacts 
sympathy; the fourth addresses the sympathy bias due to reference dependence. We discuss each 
of the hypotheses in turn.  
A. Identified Victim Effect 
The death of one Russian soldier is a tragedy; the death of millions is a statistic--Joseph Stalin 
If I look at the mass I will never act, if I look at the one I will-- Mother Teresa 
Schelling (1968) first proposed and demonstrated that an identified victim evokes greater 





deeply about individuals, while numb to the sufferings of many. As the quotes above suggest, 
Mother Theresa and Joseph Stalin both seemed to have an intuitive grasp of this—perhaps the 
only area in which they agreed on!  
There are a number of anecdotal examples related to the identified victim hypothesis. An oft-
cited example is that of the child, ‘‘Baby Jessica,’’ who received over $700,000 in donations from 
the public, when she fell in a well near her home in Texas in 1987 and received access to a trust 
fund of $800,000 when she turned 25 (CBS News 2011). Donors contributed over $48,000 to save a 
dog stranded on a ship adrift on the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii (Song, 2002). Yet, charities 
struggle to raise money to feed the famished, ill and homeless --- in both developed and developing 
countries. In essence, when an identifiable victim is made into a cause, people appear to be more 
compassionate and generous; yet they give relatively little to so-called statistical victims, facing 
enormous needs. 
Based on a dual deliberative (cognitive) and affective (emotional) process model of cognition 
(e.g., Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, Small and Lowenstein, 2005) 
argue that identifiable victims reduce social distance and thereby generate more sympathy because 
they invoke the affective (emotional) system (e.g., Small and Lowenstein 2005), while statistical 
victims invoke the deliberative (cognitive) system. The affective mode also dominates when the 
target of thought is specific, personal, and vivid as happens when we identify victims (Sherman, 
Beike, and Ryalls, 1999), but the deliberative mode is evoked by abstract and impersonal targets.  
Some scholars have argued that the identified victim effect is plausibly due to human 
sensitivity to proportions rather than absolute numbers (e.g., Friedrich et al., 1999; Jenni and 
Loewenstein, 1997).  Ten deaths concentrated in a small neighborhood of hundred people will 
evoke much greater consternation than ten deaths across a large city of a million people. The 
identified victim is an extreme example where by making the individual the cause, the reference 
group size is reduced to the victim. With a victim proportion of 100%, maximum sympathy is 
evoked. But others have shown that identification is critical, in that individuals gave more to help 





Small and Loewenstein 2003) and Kogut and Ritov 2005a). Kogut and Ritov (2005b) found that a 
single, identified victim (identified by a name and face) elicited greater emotional distress and 
more donations than a group of identified victims and more than both a single and group of 
unidentified victims. 
In this paper, we specifically test the hypothesis that a single identified victim generates more 
donors and donations, relative to a group of unidentified victims. 
B. The In-group versus Out-Group Effect  
The in-group effect suggests that potential donors are likely more sympathetic and give more 
to victims who share similarities with them because of reduced perceived social distance. The 
literature on social identity provides the foundation for the argument. Social identity is commonly 
defined as a person’s sense of self-derived from perceived membership in social groups. Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) developed the concept to understand the psychological basis for intergroup 
discrimination. Social identity has three major components: categorization, identification and 
comparison. Categorization is the process of putting people, including ourselves, into categories; 
for example, labeling a person as Chinese, Black, female, or lawyer are all different ways of 
categorization. Categorization also defines our self-image. Identification is the process by which we 
associate or identify ourselves with certain groups. We identify with in-groups, and do not identify 
with out-groups. Finally, comparison is the process by which we compare in-groups with out-
groups, creating a favorable bias toward the in-group.  
Overall, categorization of others as belonging to an in-group arouses feelings of greater 
closeness and responsibility, and augments emotional response to their misfortune through greater 
sympathy (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Dovidio et al. 1997) and willingness to help (Dovidio, 1984; 
Dovidio et al., 1997). For example, a bystander is more likely to offer help in an emergency 
situation (including natural disasters) if the victim is perceived as a member of the same social 
category as herself (Levine et al. 2002; Levine and Thompson, 2004). Cuddy, Rock and Norton 





victims were affected, Blacks/Latino  felt more sympathy for the victims compared to whites and 
vice versa. Sturmer, Snyder and Omoto (2005) found that homosexual volunteers were more likely 
to help homosexuals with AIDS than heterosexual volunteers. Kogut and Ritov (2007) find in lab 
experiments that Israeli students felt more empathy for a single Israeli victim of the Tsunami. Yet, 
they also report higher willingness of white Jewish students to contribute to a black Jewish child 
of Ethiopian descent compared to a white Jewish child. The students were white and the authors 
argue that the higher empathy for black Jews is probably a sense of responsibility for “in-group” 
people who are suffering. (Chen and Li, 2009) also find in lab experiments that participants are 
more altruistic towards an in-group match. 
We wish to note that the in-group effect does not occur only with respect to sympathy 
generation and charitable giving. It is also applicable in commercial advertising situations, where 
the goal is to persuade the target to buy a product or service for oneself. Evans (1963) showed 
that customers are more likely to buy insurance from a salesperson similar in age, religion, politics 
and even cigarette smoking habits!  
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that an in-group victim generates more donors and 
donations, relative to an out-group victim. 
C. Out-group “Identified Victim” versus “Unidentified” Group  
As discussed above, research has demonstrated that sympathy would be greater (1) for an in-
group individual relative to an out-group individual; and (2) an identified individual victim than a 
group of victims. But how does an identified out-group individual fare relative to the group? To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no research on the strength of the identified victim effect 
relative to the in-group out-group effect. While we have no apriori hypothesis on which effect is 





D. Reference Dependent Sympathy 
Our final sympathy bias hypothesis is based on the “reference dependence sympathy” effect. 
When a major disaster happens, there is large outpouring of sympathy and substantial donations 
are made. Private donations averaged USD 1839 per person for Hurricane Katrina, and as much as 
USD37 per person for 2005 Kashmir earthquake, which was not very much covered by mass media 
(Spence 2006). Yet donations for AIDS victims amount to about USD 10 per victim. Yet the 
magnitude of the problem of AIDS, malaria, famine and unsafe water is far more substantial. Over 
660,000 people die from AIDS, malaria, famine, and unsafe water per month; and that monthly 
number is close to double the number of lives lost as a result of the Asian Tsunami, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the earthquake in Kashmir.  
What explains the differences in sympathy and giving behavior? Why do we feel more 
sympathy for those who lost their homes due the housing bust than for the chronically homeless? 
The literature on reference dependence based on prospect theory suggests a possible explanation. 
Victims of chronic conditions maintain a constant-state of welfare but victims of events have 
suffered a loss in welfare. People value not an absolute amount, but rather gains and losses relative 
to a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Small (2010) shows that reference dependence 
is not only supported in the context of one’s own utility, but also applicable to sympathy 
generated for others. She finds that reference-dependent judgments and decisions are a function of 
emotional responses to changes in others welfare. When judgments are made toward a pallid 
target, the emotional mechanism ceases to exert influence; therefore, others’ losses hurt more than 
their chronic conditions.  
E. Temporal reframing: Monthly versus Daily Ask 
Marketers temporally reframe the amount of an annual donation into smaller monthly or 
daily amounts, even though donation itself is annual. Such strategies are used in a variety of 
contexts, ranging from insurance, magazine subscriptions, durable goods and charitable donations. 





than $1 a day. Gourville (1998) dubbed such temporal reframing into a small daily amount as “a 
pennies a day” (PAD) strategy.  
Standard economic theory would suggest that mere temporal reframing should not affect 
behavior. Different presentations of the same stimuli-- in this case, the same physical cash flows, 
should not alter donor behavior (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988). Gourville therefore 
proposes a two‐step consumer decision‐making process of (1) comparison retrieval and (2) 
transaction evaluation to explain why PAD strategies may be effective. He demonstrates in 
laboratory experiments that the PAD framing of a target transaction systematically fosters the 
retrieval and consideration of small ongoing expenses as the standard of comparison, whereas an 
aggregate framing of that same transaction fosters the retrieval and consideration of large 
infrequent expenses. Since most individuals indeed perform many small transactions routinely, this 
difference in retrieval makes it more likely that the individual will more favorably evaluate and 
comply with the smaller transaction. 
However, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and its derivative mental accounting 
(Thaler 1985) would predict that the PAD strategy would backfire by magnifying the perceived 
cost of the donation or spend. Their recommendation to “integrate small losses” is based on the 
idea that an individual would rather than experience many small costs, with each cost assessed at 
the steepest and most painful part of the prospect theory value function, prefer to experience one 
larger loss taking advantage of the flattening value function for increasingly larger losses. 
Hence, would the $360 transaction be perceived more favorably if temporally reframed as $30 
per month or less than $1 per day? This would depend on what type of small transaction would 
be considered more normal or less painful: ongoing monthly payments such as utility bills or 
rentals or daily spend such as for a cup of coffee or tea? If compliance is easier for monthly 
payment, where people do not have much discretion, as opposed to daily spend where there is 
discretion, it is possible that a monthly framing might be more effective. Such a framing has not 
been subject to empirical testing. We therefore do not have a strong a priori hypothesis about 





4  The Primary Experiment: New Donor Acquisition 
The Setting 
The aged are a growing population worldwide as life expectancy increases. While there are 
safety nets like social security and Medicare in the developed world to support the elderly in their 
old age, these mechanisms are not developed in countries like India and the primary source of 
support for the elderly is the support from the savings of the elderly and support from the joint 
family. With growing economic opportunities, the young migrate from their traditional homes in 
villages or set up nuclear households, leaving the elderly increasingly abandoned. Worse, the aged 
are abused with children taking control over the aged parents’ property and financial resources 
and then abandoning them. Given the magnitude of the problem, the Indian Government recently 
passed a law providing for imprisonment of children neglecting elderly parents.9  Nevertheless, 
there is great need for societal support of the elderly, especially when the children do not have the 
means to support even themselves. India has currently 90 million elderly, of whom about over 7 
million (7.8%) require some form of societal support (Rajan 2006).  
HelpAge India was founded in 1978 as a secular, not-for-profit organization registered under 
the Societies' Registration Act of 1860 to provide relief to India’s elderly through various 
activities. Focus areas include advocacy for elders’ rights, healthcare, social protection, shelters 
and disaster mitigation.10 Our investigation is around one HelpAge social protection program 
called “Support a Gran.” In this program, elderly destitutes are adopted by HelpAge and provided 
with basic food, minimal clothing and necessities and a small amount of discretionary cash on a 
monthly basis. The “Support a Gran” donations are considered “restricted gifts” in that funds 
raised for this program can only be used for this program.  
Our experiment on behalf of “Support a Gran” was done around an annual fundraising 
campaign of HelpAge in March 2011.  This fundraising campaign coincides with the Hindu festival 
9 The laws are similar in spirit to laws in developed world designed to prevent neglect of children. 




                                                   
 
 
of Holi in March, a period of celebration of the triumph of good over evil, and considered a time 
for doing good and giving. It is also fortuitously close to the annual tax filing deadline of March 
31, which perhaps serves as another incentive to “give.” The appeals are targeted to a “cold” 
mailing list of 184396 high net worth individuals in India in order to acquire new donors.  
Appeals to cold mailing lists tend to have very low response rates; typical response rates at 
HelpAge have been around 0.1%. With giving per donor averaging around ₹3000,11 the low 
response rates of about 0.1%, implies that actual money raised per mailing is only around ₹3.  
With costs of the campaign averaging around ₹6 per mailing, the campaign is considered as a loss-
leader to acquire new donors with propensity to donate, who can be more efficiently reached in 
subsequent mailings to “active” (hot) donor lists or “dormant” (warm) donor lists. In standard 
marketing parlance, this campaign is part of the acquisition cost of new donors that is worth only 
because there is a lifetime value for each acquired donor through subsequent donations. Our 
experiment imposed little incremental cost to HelpAge, except the insignificant cost of printing a 
small color flyer and including it in addition to the standard one page appeal sheet.  
Experimental Treatments 
As described earlier, we test hypotheses related to the following four psychological effects: (1) 
identified victim (2) in-group versus out-group victim (3) reference dependence sympathy and (4) 
temporal reframing--daily versus monthly ask. We provide the copy of the flyer we used in one 
condition (Individual-Ingroup-Loss-Monthly) below.  
We explain how the flyer was modified for other 11 treatment conditions. We operationalize 
the test of the identified victim effect using two different types of treatments: an individual (I) and 
group (G) condition. See stylized examples of the individual and group condition below. The areas 
marked in bold are the text which change for different conditions (apart from appropriate change 
of pronouns and names in the rest of the text). 
11 The exchange rate in May 2011 averaged ₹44.93 (Indian Rupees) for $1 (U.S. Dollar). (www.xrate.com) 
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In the individual condition, we describe an identified individual (Sushila in the example) 
along with her photograph, while in the group condition we describe the victims as group of four 
women (who are shown in a picture collage) and describe the group.12 We implement the in-group 
and out-group treatment as sub-treatments within the individual condition: As Hindus are the 
overwhelmingly majority community in India and Christians form a very small minority, we use a 
Hindu woman (Sushila) for the in-group treatment. For the out-group treatment, we use a 
Christian woman belonging to the Anglo-Indian community (Shirley Barrett). The individuals 
pictured had to be real beneficiaries with real stories of the non-profit as per the ethical guidelines 
of the organization. We could not therefore merely change the names of the beneficiaries with the 
same image. We discuss a subsequent robustness check using an M-Turk experiment to rule out if 
the attitude to the charity changed due to differences in the images in the in-group-outgroup 
condition among Hindu respondents.  
12 While the individual treatment uses a Hindu and Christian woman as victim (the religion is not mentioned, but can 
be inferred from their names), the group treatment simply describes a group of four women, without mentioning 
religion. While we could have mentioned they were Hindu or Christian even in the group condition and obtained a fully 
crossed design, HelpAge did not consider it appropriate to mention religion in the flyer. Further not mentioning religion 
in the group condition made it in some ways more comparable to the individual treatment where religion is not 
mentioned, but only (potentially) inferred by the reader from the name. 
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These ladies share a common story. They worked as school teachers and 
retired comfortably.  But then they became destitute when their husbands passed away 
and other family members refused to support them.  
Support a Gran has helped them all meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter in 
their time of need.  Today in their seventies, they lead a dignified life. 
Your tax deductible donation of ₹9000 a year (that is just ₹750 a month) helps these 
and other people like them a life of dignity in their golden years.  
We implement the reference dependent sympathy treatment as follows. For the loss condition, 
we highlight the fact that the individual concerned had lived an independent life earlier as a school 
teacher and retired, before she became destitute. In a lab experiment, to create the contrasting 
chronic treatment, we could have stated that “Sushila has led a life of deprivation all her life.” 
However, as this was a natural field experiment, HelpAge policy would not allow for any kind of 
deception or falsehood in messaging. Hence we chose an "uncertain" reference treatment, where we 
omit mentioning about her past life. So we dropped the first line: "Sushila worked as a school 
teacher and retired comfortably."   The uncertain treatment started with the following sentence: 
“Sushila became destitute when her husband passed away…” Similarly, the group treatment also 
dropped the reference to the past and simply said: “These ladies share a common story. They 
became destitute, when their husbands passed away…” 
We implement the monthly-daily temporal reframing treatment as follows. While everyone is 




Sushila worked as a school teacher and retired comfortably. But she became 
destitute when her husband passed away and other family members refused to support 
her.  
Support a Gran has helped Sushila meet her basic needs of food, clothing and shelter in 
her time of need.  Today in her seventies, she leads a dignified life.  
Your tax deductible donation of ₹9000 a year (that is just ₹750 a month) helps Sushila 





same amount is framed as ₹750 a month for the monthly condition and ₹25 a day for the daily 
condition.13  
In the control condition, HelpAge sends its routine flyer—a one page sheet requesting for 
donation. In each of the treatment conditions, in addition to the routine flyer, an additional one 
page flyer—described above was sent. All of the flyers are presented in the online appendix.  
Experimental Design  
Within the individual treatment, we follow a full factorial design on the in-group-out-group, 
reference dependence (loss/uncertain) and temporal reframing (monthly/daily) ask conditions. 
Thus we have 2×2×2=8 conditions in the individual treatments. As we explained earlier, within 
the group treatment, we do not providing any identifying characteristics including religion—hence 
we do not have an in-group and out-group condition in the group treatment. So we only have the 
remaining 2×2=4 conditions within the group treatment. Finally, we have a control condition, 
where we do not send the additional flyer at all; this is what HelpAge would have done in the 
absence of our experiment. Thus in all, we have 8+4+1=13 treatment conditions. 
The full set of treatments is listed in Table 1. The mnemonics provided will serve to identify 
treatments in a meaningful manner. 
*** Insert Table 1 here*** 
We randomly assign names on the mailing list roughly equally to 12 treatments and leave a 
slightly larger number of names for the control treatment. The exact number of mailings for each 
treatment is reported in Table 2 along with the descriptive statistics.14 
*** Insert Table 2 here*** 
13 As a price reference, a regular cup of coffee at India’s largest coffee chain Café Coffee Day costs ₹40. In that sense, it 
satisfies the “pennies a day” logic of a routine and ongoing daily expense. 
14 To assess the effectiveness of the randomization, we check whether the number of mailings is roughly equal across the 
main observable we have in the mailing list: the different states of India. Indeed the assignments are roughly equal for 
all treatments at the level of each state. 
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5  Results 
Summary Statistics 
We report summary statistics associated with each of the treatment cells in Table 2. Roughly 
14000 people were assigned to each treatment condition, while about 15,500 were assigned to the 
control condition. We report three outcome metrics for each treatment: (1) donation rate, i.e., % 
of mailings that generated a donation; (2) donation amount per mailing (₹/mail); and (3) 
donation amount per donor (₹/donor), i.e., donation amount, conditional on giving. 
The highest donation rate and ₹/mail is for the Individual-In-group (Hindu)-Loss-Monthly 
(IHLM) condition. This condition generated 3.3 (0.36/0.11) times the donation rate as the control 
condition. Further the ₹/mail in this condition is 3.78 (16.28/4.30) times the amount generated in 
the control condition. In contrast, the worst performing Group-Loss-Daily (G_LD) condition 
produced only 59% of donors and raised only 60% of ₹/mail relative to the control. In general, the 
group mailer is not only ineffective, but in combination with the daily ask framing performs 
substantially worse than the control condition. Overall, these results suggest that relatively minor 
variations in advertising content significantly affect persuasion and charitable giving.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
We test our hypotheses about the persuasive effects of alternative treatments by comparing 
(1) the donation rate and (2) ₹/mail across the relevant treatments. An additional question is 
when there is an increase in ₹/mail, whether it is only due to a higher donation rate or whether 
individuals who donate also feel more sympathy and give more. For this, one cannot simply 
compare ₹/donor, i.e., donation, conditional on giving, because when the more effective treatment 
generates more donors, the marginal donors are innately less interested in the cause and are 
therefore likely to give less. To make an apples-to-apples comparison, we can rank the donors in 





amounts for a donor of given rank.15 The logic is that if treatment A generates more sympathy, a 
donor of a given rank subject to treatment A should give more relative to an identically ranked 
donor subject to treatment B.16  
A. Identified Victim Effect 
Figure 1 shows the results for the identified victim effect. Panel A compares the donation 
rates across the individual and group conditions. The average donation rate in the individual 
condition is 0.24%, while it is only 0.09% for the group condition and the difference is significant 
(p<0.05). Thus the donation rate for the individual treatment is 2.55 times the donation rate in 
the group treatments.  
Panel B compares the ₹/mail. Not only is the donation rate higher in the individual condition 
the donations raised per mailing is also higher. While, the average donation per mailing is ₹8.83 in 
the individual condition, it is only ₹4.20 in the group condition. This ratio of 2.1 shows that a 
charity more than doubles donation dollars by recognizing the identified victim sympathy bias in 
making its appeals. 
Panel C graphs the ratio of individual to group donations of identically ranked pair of donors. 
There are 51 donations in the group condition and 260 donations in the individual condition. 
However the number of mailers in the individual condition is (roughly) double the number of 
mailers in the group condition. Given the percentile discussion in footnote 14, this translates to 
comparing the 51 ranked donations in the group condition against the top 51 odd ranked 
donations in the individual condition. All of the 51 ratios are at or above 1, suggesting that the 
identified victim effect not only causes more donors to give, but also increases the giving among 
15 Comparing donations of persons of identical rank is valid only if we have identical number of mailings in the different 
comparison treatments. Otherwise, one will have to compare donors of identical percentiles rather than ranks. 
16 However there may be other possibilities for the donation decision process. As an example, the additional donors for 
the more effective treatment may be systematically wealthier and therefore give more, unrelated to their level of 
sympathy. As we do not have demographic information on the donors, we are unable to rule out this explanation by 
checking whether there are any systematic differences in donor demographics for the different treatments. We hope 
future research can address this issue. We thank a reviewer for raising this possibility. 
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those that give. The effect is statistically significant; the mean of the ratio is 3.6 and the 95% 
confidence interval of (3.05, 4.16) clearly excludes 1. 
B. In-Group versus Out-group Identified Victim 
Figure 2 shows the results of the tests for in-group versus out-group. From Panel A, we see 
that the donation rate in the in-group condition is higher at 0.28%, relative to the out-group 
condition at 0.19%. Thus, the number of donors increase by 42% with an in-group individual 
relative to the out-group individual. The difference is statistically significant at the 95% level. 
Note that, the average individual effect of 0.24%, reported in Figure 1 is the average of the in-
group and out-group effect. 
From panel B, we see that the ₹/mail is also higher at ₹11.29 for the in-group condition, 
relative to ₹6.38 for the out-group condition thus generating 77% more donations. Comparing the 
increase in donation rate of 43%, and the increase in donations of 77%, we can conclude that not 
only does an in-group lead more donors to give, those donors also give substantially more to in-
group victims. 
Panel C show that conditional on giving, identically ranked individuals in the in-group 
condition, give more than the donors in the out-group condition. As roughly identical number of 
mailers was sent in the in-group and out-group conditions, we directly compare the donations of 
the same rank. There are 153 in-group donations and 107 out-group donations. We therefore 
compare the top 107 ranks in both the conditions. Only two of the 107 pairs have ratios less than 
1. The effect is statistically significant; the mean of the ratio is 2.61 and the 95% confidence 
interval of (2.40, 2.82) clearly excludes 1. 
One concern here is that even though our potential donor base is predominantly Hindu, there 
are also Christian and Muslim potential donors in the sample. Even though we do not have access 
to the religion information of the potential donor database, the email list provider indicates that 
Hindus consisted of about 90% of the sample, Muslims about 7%, Christians about 2% and others 





and the differences are potentially biased. In the appendix we show mathematically that the 
difference in giving rates when the exact identity of the potential donor is known will be larger 
relative to the estimates we obtain where some of the potential donors are also from the outgroup. 
Thus the current estimates of the difference between in-group and outgroup giving are an 
underestimate. We report robustness and mechanism checks around the in-group result using a 
survey based experiment in Section 6. 
C. Out-group “Identified Victim” versus “Unidentified” Group  
Figure 3 compares the out-group “identified victim” effect against the “unidentified” group. 
From panel A, we see that the average rate of donations in the identified out-group condition is 
higher at 0.19%, relative to the group condition at 0.09%, Overall, the number of donors can be 
increased by 110% with an out-group identified individual relative to an unidentified group, 
suggesting that the identified victim effect is stronger than the in-group effect in inducing 
sympathy and giving. The difference is clearly statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Not only is the donation rate higher. From panel B, we see that that the identified out-group 
condition generates 52% more donations; ₹/mail is ₹6.38 for the out-group condition, relative to 
₹4.29 for the group condition.  
Roughly equal number of mailers was send to the out-group and group conditions. So we 
directly compare donations of a given rank. Given 107 donations from the outgroup condition, and 
51 donations from the group condition, we compare the top 51 pairs of donations from each 
condition. Only one of 51 pairs has a lower ratio than 1. The effect is statistically significant; the 
mean of the ratio is 2.04 and the 95% confidence interval is (1.80, 2.28), excludes 1.  
D. Reference Dependent Sympathy 
Figure 4 shows the tests for reference dependence sympathy by comparing the loss condition 





higher at 0.23%, relative to the uncertain condition at 0.15% (p <0.05). Overall, the number of 
donors was higher by 51% in the loss condition.  
Panel B shows that the ₹/mail is also higher at ₹8.37 for the loss condition, relative to ₹6.28 
for the uncertain condition. Thus the loss condition generates 33% more in terms of funds raised. 
Panel C also shows that conditional on giving, identically ranked individuals in the loss 
condition give more than the donors in the uncertain condition. We had 187 donations in the loss 
condition and 124 donations in the uncertain condition. Only 4 out of 124 pairs have a ratio less 
than 1. The mean of the ratio is 1.97 and the 95% confidence interval is (1.81, 2.14), excludes 1.  
A potential alternative explanation for the greater giving in the loss condition could be that 
school teachers may be an in-group with respect to the donors. We note that the socioeconomic 
status of the potential donors is much higher than those of school teachers and therefore  school 
teachers are an unlikely in-group for these potential donors, and possibly an out-group in terms of 
socioeconomic status. Nevertheless, the issue needs further exploration in future field research. 
E. Temporal Reframing: Monthly versus Daily Ask 
Figure 5 compares outcomes for the monthly versus daily asks. From panel A, we find that 
that the donation rate is higher in the monthly condition at 0.24%, relative to the daily condition 
at 0.14%. Thus, the monthly condition increases donation rate by 71%. The effect is statistically 
significant (p<0.05). 
From panel B, we see that the ₹/mail is also higher at ₹9.10 for the monthly condition, 
relative to ₹5.47 for the daily condition. Thus the monthly condition also leads to 66% more funds 
raised. Overall, in contrast to recent support for the pennies a day framing effect, we find that 
monthly temporal reframing actually leads to better persuasive outcomes.  
 Panel C demonstrates that conditional on giving, donors on average do give more in the 
monthly condition. We had 216 donations in the monthly condition and 115 donations in the daily 





leads to more robust and higher donations compared to daily reframing. The mean of the ratio is 
3.69 and the 95% confidence interval is (3.17, 4.2), which excludes 1.  
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Thus far, we analyzed the data---one pair of treatments at a time. We now analyze the 
experimental data through two multivariate regressions that controls for simultaneous variations in 
multiple treatments: a logistic regression on donation choice and a tobit regression on donation 
amounts. We use a tobit regression, because donations are left censored at zero. The results are 
reported in Table 3. 
The logistic regression results report both the coefficient estimates and the odds ratios. The 
individual coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.01). This represents the individual-outgroup 
condition in the regression, and shows that the individual-outgroup condition more than doubles 
the odds of donation (odds ratio=2.1), over the group condition. The in-group condition further 
increases the effectiveness of the outgroup condition relative to the group condition by about 40% 
(odds ratio 1.41). We note that in combination, the individual-ingroup condition increases the 
odds of donations three times relative to the group condition. This can also be directly checked by 
replacing the “individual” variable with “outgroup” variable in the logistic regression. Thus the 
identified victim effect is substantial; even an identified out-group victim overwhelms giving for a 
group of victims.  
Further, the results show significant effects of reference dependence, with the loss condition 
increasing the odds of donations by 51% relative to the uncertain condition. Finally, temporal 
reframing affects donations, with monthly ask increasing the odds of donations by 71%.  
The tobit regression results show that our treatments significantly affect the donation 
amounts. Specifically, we find that the in-group identified victim treatment (captured by the 
Individual+Ingroup coefficient) raises ₹4851 per donor more than the group treatment. Even the 
out-group identified victim raises ₹3095 more than the group treatment. Reference dependence in 





monthly temporal framing leads to greater giving of ₹2438 relative to a daily temporal frame. 
Overall these results show strong statistical and economic significance of advertising content 
effects.17 
6  Robustness Checks 
We conduct two robustness checks. The first seeks to assess the robustness of the ingroup-
outgroup hypothesis. The second addresses the question that while we have demonstrated large 
effects of advertising content for a cold list, consistent with sympathy biases, whether such effects 
are likely to hold also for a warm list where people have already shown an interest in the cause.  
The In-group- Outgroup Effect Replication Using Survey based Experiments 
We demonstrated in the field experiment that an ask around an in-group person (Hindu 
woman where the cold list is about 90% Hindu) leads to higher donation rates and donation 
amounts than an out-group person (Christian woman). Nevertheless, our result is open to other 
alternative interpretations. For example, it might be the case that Christian women may be 
considered to be wealthier on average and may be seen to have less “needs” and therefore may 
generate less donations. If indeed it is the outgroup effect driving the lower donations, it must be 
the case that potential Christian donors are more likely to donate to the Christian subject and less 
to the Hindu subject. However, given the low number of potential Christian donors this is hard to 
test within our field sample. 
We therefore conducted a survey based experiment to assess this question. First, we 
conducted a survey through M-Turk on Indian respondents where we showed the same flyer as in 
our cold list experiment (with individual condition, loss condition and monthly condition) but one 
17 As the group condition did not have ingroup and outgroup sub-conditions, we cannot identify an interaction effect of 
ingroup-outgroup with the individual condition beyond the main effects of individual and ingroup from the experimental 
data.. Other interactions with respect to loss or month conditions were not significant. We therefore report only the 
main effects. In general, logistic regressions have some level of interactions built in due to their intrinsic nonlinearity and 
this may explain why the loss or month interactions were not significant. 
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group receiving the flyer with the Hindu woman (Sushila) and the other   group receiving the flyer 
with the Christian woman (Shirley). After reading the flyer, the respondents were asked about 
their likelihood of giving (1-10 scale), whether they had given in the past, their religion, education 
and income. Unfortunately, the respondents through M-Turk were disproportionately Hindu. 
Given our interest in getting additional Christian respondents, we augmented our sample through 
an email mailing list of Christian respondents from an Indian direct marketing company (Yellow 
Umbrella) and did the identical survey with these respondents, randomizing for in-group and out-
group treatments. 
The results from the survey are reported in Table 3a-b. Table 3a provides the descriptive 
statistics across the four groups: (1) Hindus asked to donate for Sushila (in-group); (2) Hindus 
asked to donate for Shirley (outgroup) (3) Christians asked to donate for Sushila (out-group); (2) 
Christians asked to donate for Shirley (ingroup). Hindus say they would give more overall in the 
sample, though their income and educational conditions are not higher. Past giving is roughly 
similar across all treatments, except for Christians asked to give to Shirley. What is clear is the 
base rates of giving are higher for ingroups relative to outgroups for both Hindus and Christians. 
This is particularly interesting given that the past giving is much lower for Christians facing the 
Shirley treatment (ingroup) compared to Christians facing the Sushila treatment (outgroup).  
Table 3b reports results of an OLS regression on the likelihood of giving (a 10 point scale) 
with controls for past giving and education to test the ingroup-outgroup effect. These results show 
that the ingroup effects are indeed statistically significant for both Hindus (p<0.1) and Christians 
(p<0.05). Not surprisingly, Past giving is overall very significant and higher levels of education 
lead to higher giving. Income was highly correlated with education and created multicollinearity 
issues, hence we dropped income from the final regression we report (education had better 
explanatory power). This survey-based experiment result not only replicates the ingroup effect for 
Hindus from the field experiment, but also supports the ingroup effect for Christians, giving us 





Next, we explore whether the difference in giving for ingroup and outgroup is caused by 
differences in attitudes towards the charity rather than differences in sympathy.18  We ran a 
second M-Turk experiment randomizing the ingroup and outgroup condition across Hindu 
respondents and asked them to rate the charity on a 10 point scale on three dimensions adapted 
from Webb et al (2000). The three questions are: (1) HelpAge India serves a good cause; (2) 
HelpAge India is a well-managed charity; (3) I have a positive image of HelpAge India. 
The regression results are reported in Table 3c. For all three questions, the Sushila (ingroup) 
variable is insignificant, indicating no statistically difference in donor’s perceptions of the charity 
based on the ingroup or outgroup treatments. Thus the difference in likelihood of giving does not 
appear to rise due to differences in how the charity is perceived based on the target recipient 
featured in the charity.   
*** Insert Table 3a-c here*** 
Raising Donations from Past Donors 
Thus far, we have demonstrated that advertising content has large effects on both donation 
rates and amounts raised. The odds of giving increased from as low as 51% between the loss and 
uncertain condition tests for the reference dependence sympathy effect to as high as 300% for the 
in-group relative to the group condition for the identified victim effect.  
We conjectured that sympathy biases may have relatively strong impact in the context of new 
donations, because the baseline levels of sympathy might be lower. But the effects of sympathy 
bias on donations may be more muted when the base levels of sympathy are higher. To test this, 
we decided to test if the effects of sympathy bias may be replicated among past donors, for whom 
the baseline sympathy for the cause must be higher. 19 
18 We thank a reviewer for the suggestion. 
19 Another possibility is that past experience with HelpAge has reduced the uncertainty (lower variance) about the 
charity; hence the framing effects may have limited impact on the warm list. Whether learning on selection accounts for 
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HelpAge conducted multiple mailings to their warm list of past donors. One such mailing was 
in November 2011 around the festival of Diwali—the festival of lights---which is celebrated almost 
all over India. While Diwali has religious legends associated with the ascendancy of good over evil, 
it also coincides with the end of the Indian harvest season, and again has been associated with gift 
giving and charitable giving.  
HelpAge was reluctant to test the entire set of previous experimental treatments on their 
warm list of past donors, given that the results appear to favor monthly ask, and loss condition for 
reference dependence. However, they were curious about understanding the boundaries around the 
identified victim effect. We therefore tested the individual and group treatments from the earlier 
experiment (with loss framing and monthly ask), where the photos and text communicated either 
the suffering of the individual or group. To this, we add a third treatment, where we showed a 
group photo, but in the text we used a story that used the example of a particular individual. The 
goal was to test whether the text associated with the individual evoked the identified victim 
sympathy bias, while the group picture communicated that this is a problem for a larger group. 
We show the treatment associated with the Group Photo-Individual Text condition below. 




These ladies share a common story. For example, Sushila worked as a school 
teacher and retired comfortably.  But then she became destitute when her husband 
passed away and other family members refused to support her.  
Support a Gran has helped people like Sushila meet their basic needs of food, clothing and 
shelter in their time of need.  Today in their seventies, they lead a dignified life. 
Your tax deductible donation of ₹9000 a year (that is just ₹750 a month) helps Sushila 
and people like her live a life of dignity in their golden years.  
Experimental Design 
the differences in rates of giving across the warm and cold list would be an interesting possibility for future research. We 
thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the learning explanation as a possibility. 
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The three treatments (as described above) and the number of mailings for the three 
treatments and descriptive statistics are listed in Tables 4a and 4b. We also report on the past 
giving of donors which are standard in the direct marketing literature such on recency (# years 
since past donation), frequency (#times donated in last 5 years) and monetary value of donations 
in the past (average value of previous donations) in each treatment; we will use them as controls 
in addition to the treatments in analyzing the donations. The mnemonics provided serve to 
identify treatments in a meaningful manner. We randomly assign names on the mailing list to the 
three treatments, but given that we expected the group condition to be the least effective, we sent 
only half the number of mailings to this condition. The exact number of mailings for each 
treatment is reported in Table 4b along with the descriptive statistics. As expected, the giving 
with this warm list average about 1.2%, about four times higher than with the cold list. The ₹ per 
mailing also was higher at ₹45. This validates the use of cold lists to generate donors (even at a 
loss) in order to be able to more efficiently raise funds in subsequent fundraisers targeted to past 
donors. 
*** Insert Table 4 here*** 
Results 
Figure 6 reports the results in terms of donation rates and ₹/mail under the three conditions. 
As before, we replicate the result that the individual condition (with both individual photo and 
text) generated more donors and higher amounts of donations relative to the group condition 
(with both group photo and group text). The difference in donor rates (1.33% versus 1.14%) 
however is smaller than with the cold list of new donors, and is significantly different only at 
p<.01. ₹/mail is also higher at ₹53.10 for the individual condition, relative to ₹50.7 for the group 
condition, an increase of 4.7%. To our surprise, we found the group photo-individual text 
condition generated worse outcomes than the pure group condition. Donor rates were only 0.95%, 
while the ₹/mail is also substantially lower at ₹37.40. We speculate that having the individual text 





destroys the fluency of the message, by mixing up a group story with an individual example, 
rather than generating a bump up in donation rates relative to the group message. 
The results of the logistic and tobit regressions for donation choice and donation amounts are 
reported in Tables 4b and 4c respectively. Indeed the results reported under model 1 in Tables 4b 
and 4c are both qualitatively and quantitatively identical to the paired treatment comparison 
results discussed in the previous paragraph. In Model 2, we report the results of the logistic and 
tobit regressions, controlling for donor heterogeneity exhibited through past donation choices 
described earlier. The effects of the experimental treatments continue to be virtually identical in 
magnitude relative to the regressions without the controls, reflecting the fact that our assignment 
to treatments was random; at the very least this should give faith in the quality of our random 
assignment. In terms of substantive insights from the control variables, we find that recent and 
more frequent donors are not only more likely to donate, but also donate more. We see that higher 
monetary value of past donations has a negative impact, but only significant at p<0.1). While we 
cannot explain the negative impact, we note that even if considered significant, the economic 
magnitude is small. A ₹1000 increase in total past giving reduces the odds by only about 1% (odds 
ratio of .99), which is much smaller than the impact of other variables. However larger monetary 
amounts do predict greater current dollar value of donations as expected.20 
Thus we conclude that the effects of sympathy bias affect donation behavior even among past 
donors, who are already sympathetic to the cause, but the framing effects are attenuated relative 
to the cold list setting. Given that the number of donors and the amount of money raised with the 
warm list is about 10 times greater, the 16% increases in donors and the 4.7% increase in the 
amount of money raised is comparable in economic magnitude in terms of incremental donors and 
money raised with new donor acquisition. Hence we conclude that effects of sympathy biases 
continue to remain economically significant even among warm donors.   
20 We tested for interactions between past giving and treatment. We did not find significant interactions for donation 
rates. In the tobit regression on donation amount, we found negative interactions with recency and positive interactions 
with monetary value for the treatments.  
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7  Conclusion 
This paper investigated the persuasive effects of advertising content on target outcomes, in 
the context of fund raising through the use of large scale field experiments. Our experimental 
treatments were guided by the psychological literature on sympathy biases and framing effects. 
Broadly, we find that even minor variations in the persuasive message have large and dramatic 
impact on donor behavior, both in terms of the donation rates and amounts raised. The results are 
particularly dramatic and stark, given that there are no differences in incentives, match rates or 
social pressure, which have been the focus of much previous research. Minor differences in 
language, lead to fairly large differences in outcomes. More specifically, our key findings are as 
follows: 
1. Framing has large effects on donor response both in terms of donation rates and donation 
amounts (₹/mail). Among potential new donors, donation rates increase from as low as 51% 
between the two reference dependence conditions to as high as 300% for the in-group relative 
to the group condition. The sympathy bias and framing effects are much larger among new 
donors relative past donors in percentage terms, but as the giving rates are much higher 
among past donors, the incremental money raised in dollar terms is larger with the warm list. 
2. We find significant evidence of the identified victim effect; an individually identified victim is 
likely to generate over two and a half times more donors and over twice the donations relative 
to an unidentified group of four victims.  
3. When the identified victim is from an in-group (Hindu majority in India), the treatment 
generates substantially more donors and donations than when the identified victim is from an 
out-group (Christian minority). An in-group victim increases donation rates by almost 50%, 
and nearly doubles funds raised. Even an identified out-group victim does better relative to 
unidentified group of victims.  
4. We find support for reference dependent sympathy. When victims are described as currently 





average donations than someone who is destitute, but the past was left un-described. This 
supports the hypotheses that the chronic poor are less likely to elicit sympathy than someone 
who suffered a change—i.e., fell into poverty in old age. 
5. We find no support of the “pennies a day” hypothesis. The monthly temporal framing 
generated 71% more donors and 66% more donations than the daily framing, even when the 
daily frame was in terms of an amount that is smaller than the price of a coffee in urban 
India. 
6. The ratio graphs of the amount donated across conditions for the corresponding rank of the 
give (panel C) in Figures 1-4 show that the strength of each effect tested is extremely 
powerful—to the best of our knowledge, such a result has never been presented in the 
behavioral literature. This representation based on a paired test is more convincing that a 
mere means and proportion test that is typically presented in the behavioral literature. 
Empirical research using field data on advertising has focused primarily on how advertising 
spend and timing affect market outcomes; there has been little systematic research on how 
advertising content affects outcomes. Our results show that varying advertising content through 
theoretical results identified in psychology has economically significant impact on the market 
outcomes in real world settings. This is particularly important as these treatments add little 
incremental cost, yet have dramatic impact on market outcomes.   
There are of course a few caveats that we should highlight. First as with all experimental 
research, the effect sizes are likely a function of the particular treatments. For example, the loss 
treatment can be made stronger by making the losses of the victim more vivid; or we could make 
the ingroup effect stronger by priming religion more explicitly, and/or emphasizing geography 
(state or city) or linguistic connections. Similarly the effect sizes can vary across contexts. For 
example, our donation request is in the context of a chronic poverty condition, but if the ask is 
around a disastrous event (e.g., earthquake, tsunami etc.) to help destitute seniors, the effect sizes 





holidays. The overall giving may be more muted during other seasons. As we show in the paper, 
the effect sizes are different for cold lists versus warm lists--—a managerially important 
distinction. The differences in framing effect sizes by treatment and context is similar to variations 
in price and advertising elasticities documented in empirical work across categories and in different 
shopping and media contexts, that typically gets summarized through meta-analysis over time 
(e.g., Tellis 1988; Kaul and Wittink 1995). Finally, one issue in managerial use of these results is 
whether the effects of sympathy biases might wane over time with repeated use on in competitive 
settings, if all fundraisers apply such ideas. As with much psychological research on framing effects 
such as loss aversion, endowment effects etc., we believe these effects are unlikely to fade due to 
repeated use or use by competitors, but these issues are worthy of testing in future work. 
We hope our research continues to bridge the gap between behavioral and quantitative 
marketing research not just in the area of advertising, but also more broadly by triggering research 
agendas around field validation and conceptual replications for various behavioral theories by 
quantitative empirical scholars. While behavioral research focuses on identifying new theories and 
exploring the theoretical mechanisms underlying the psychological effects, empirical research by 
quantitative marketers and economists is more focused on measuring the magnitude of effects and 
relative effect size of alternative marketing levers in naturally occurring data. In practice, 
naturally occurring empirical data do not have the variations to measure psychological effects and 
therefore there is often the question of whether behavioral effects identified in the lab can be 
observed in real world settings and how economically meaningful the effect sizes are. This study 
demonstrates that experimental treatments based on well documented theories in psychology can 
be implemented in the form of experimental treatments in practical and natural field settings with 
a very light touch and still produce large economically relevant effects. Such research focused on 
measuring relative effect sizes of previously identified behavioral effects in natural settings should 
be valuable for not only quantitative marketers and economists interested in whether psychological 
theories matter in the field, but also for managers interested in choosing among the 
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Proposition: The difference in giving rates for ingroup and outgroup victims when the potential 
donor list consists only of ingroup members will be greater than or equal to the difference in giving 
rates for ingroup and outgroup victims when the donor list has a mix of ingroup and outgroup 
members with ingroup members being a majority in the mailing list. 
Let α  and (1 )α−  be the proportion of ingroup and outgroup potential donors respectively 
in the mailing list. Let the giving rate towards ingroup and outgroup victims be x  and xβ  
respectively, where 1β ≤  by the logic that the outgroup donation rate would be at most as large 
as the ingroup donation rate. The table below clarifies the giving rates for ingroup and outgroup 




Giving rate to 
Ingroup Victims 
Giving rate to 
Outgroup Victims 
α  Ingroup x  xβ  
(1 )α−  Outgroup xβ  x  
 
If the donor sample only had the ingroup (i.e., 1α =  ), then the difference in the giving 
rate between the ingroup and outgroup victims would be (1 )x x xβ β− = −  . 
When the donor list has a mix of ingroup and outgroup members whose group membership 
cannot be identified, the estimated giving rate for ingroup victims will be: (1 )x xα α β+ − . The 
estimated giving rate for the outgroup victims will be: (1 )x xαβ α+ − . The difference in estimated 
giving rate between the ingroup and outgroup victims will be 
(1 ) ( (1 ) ) (1 ) (2 1)x x x x xα α β αβ α β α+ − − + − = − − . When the ingroup members are in the majority, 






Figure 1: Identified Victim: Individual versus Group Effect 
 
A. Donation Rate 
 
Ratio (individual/group)=2.55 
Individual CI: (.210%, 0.264% ) 




Individual CI: (6.96, 10.71 ) 
Group CI: (2.01, 6.38) 
 
C. Ratio of Individual/Group Donation 
Amounts (for rank adjusted for # of mailers) 
 


















































Figure 2: In-group versus Out Group Effect 
 
A. Donation Rate 
 
Ratio (ingroup/outgroup)=1.42 
Ingroup 95% CI: (0.233%, 0.320%) 






Ingroup 95% CI: (8.25, 14.32) 




C. Ratio of Ingroup/Outgroup Donation  
(for given rank) 
  


















































Figure 3: Out-group versus Group Effect 
 
A. Donation Rate 
 
Ratio (outgroup/group)=2.11 
Outgroup 95% CI: (0.157%, 0.230%) 






Outgroup 95% CI: (4.19, 8.56) 




C. Ratio of Out-group/Group Donation  
(for given rank) 
 

















































Figure 4: Reference Dependence: Loss Versus Uncertain Reference Effect 
 
A. Donations Per Mailing 
 
Ratio (loss/uncertain)=1.51 
Loss 95% CI: (0.193%, 0.257%) 





Loss CI: (6.41, 10.17) 




C. Ratio of Loss/Uncertain Donation  
(for given rank) 
  























































Figure 5: Temporal Framing: Monthly versus Daily Ask 
 
A. Donations Per Mailing 
 
Ratio (monthly/daily)=1.71 
Monthly CI: (0.203%, 0.269%) 





Monthly CI: (6.90, 11.0) 
Daily CI: (3.60, 7.34) 
 
 
C. Ratio of Monthly/Daily Donation  
(for given rank) 
  

























































Figure 6: Past Donor Experiment 
 




IPIT 95% CI: (1.22%, 1.43%) 
GPIT 95% CI: (0.87%, 1.05%) 






IPIT 95% CI: (40.97, 65.23) 
GPIT 95% CI: (31.66, 43.15) 
















1 IHLM Individual Hindu Loss Monthly 
2 IHUM Individual Hindu Uncertain Monthly 
3 IHLD Individual Hindu Loss Daily 
4 IHUD Individual Hindu Uncertain Daily 
5 ICLM Individual Christian Loss Monthly 
6 ICUM Individual Christian Uncertain Monthly 
7 ICLD Individual Christian Loss Daily 
8 ICUD Individual Christian Uncertain Daily 
9 G_LM Group NA Loss Monthly 
10 G_UM Group NA Uncertain Monthly 
11 G_LD Group NA Loss Daily 
12 G_UD Group NA Uncertain Daily 













































Table 2a: New Donor Experiment: Summary of Experiment Outcomes  
Treatment Mnemonic # Mailed %Donate ₹/Mailing ₹/Donor 
1 IHLM 13826 0.36% 16.28 4501 
2 IHUM 13832 0.27% 9.29 3474 
3 IHLD 13823 0.34% 11.96 3516 
4 IHUD 13669 0.14% 7.63 5561 
5 ICLM 13832 0.34% 12.24 3603 
6 ICUM 13805 0.22% 6.45 2967 
7 ICLD 13820 0.14% 2.93 2134 
8 ICUD 13690 0.08% 3.88 4886 
9 G_LM 13859 0.11% 3.77 3480 
10 G_UM 13682 0.12% 6.59 5341 
11 G_LD 13876 0.06% 2.59 3996 
12 G_UD 13682 0.07% 3.85 5339 
13 Control 15506 0.11% 4.30 3958 
Overall 184396 0.17% 6.98 3993 
Average for 12 
Treatments 
165982 0.19% 7.29 3889 
 
Table 2b: New Donor Experiment: Logistic Regression on Donation Choice 
 Logistic Regression on 
Donation Choice 































 -43.42 -47312*** 
(2557) 
-18.50 
N 165982     















Give Education Income 
Hindu-Sushila 139 7.50 2.48 0.24 4.14 4.14 
Hindu-Shirley 155 6.97 2.53 0.27 4.12 4.08 
Christian-Sushila 57 5.98 2.99 0.26 4.35 5.54 





Table 3b: Survey Based Experiment-1: Likelihood of Giving 
 
Coefficient 
(std. err) t-stat 
Coefficient 
(std. err) t-stat 








































N 392  392  
Base Treatment is: Christian-Sushila 
Base level of Education is less than 12th Grade 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
21 A Diploma is 3 year vocational degree from a technical training institution that is entered after 10th grade. It is lower 
in prestige than a three or four year Bachelor’s degree that is entered after 12th grade.  
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N 252 252 252 
Education is not statistically significant, but increases standard errors, so they are not included. 
The coefficients on Sushila remain qualitatively similar without Past giving as covariate.  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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44000 0.62 .920 3066 1.325% 53.10 4007 
2 Group Photo- 
Individual Text 
(GPIT) 




22000 0.63 .927 2980 1.136% 50.74 4465 






Table 4b: Past Donor Experiment: Logistic Regression on Donation Choice 














1.16 2.04 0.15* 
(.08) 
1.16 1.99 




0.83 -2.19 -0.018** 
(0.075) 
0.83 -2.22 
Donation in Past Year?  
(Recency) 
   0.61*** 
(0.123) 
1.84 4.99 
# Donations in 5 years  
(Frequency)  
   0.74*** 
(0.02) 
2.09 38.41 
Total Donations in 5 Years  
(Monetary Value in thousands) 





0.011 -70.21 -6.15 
(0.121) 
0.002 -50.46 
N 109999   109999  
Base Treatment is: Group Photo-Group Text (GPGT) Condition 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table 4c: Past Donor Experiment: Tobit Regression on Donation Amount 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimate 
(Std. Err) 
       t-stat Estimate 
(Std. Err) 
       t-stat 














Donation in Past Year?  
(Recency) 
  1354*** 
(567) 
2.39 
# Donations in 5 years  
(Frequency)  
  4274*** 
(153) 
27.86 
Total Donations in 5 Years  
(Monetary Value) 













N 109999  109999  
N (Left Censored at 0) 108746  108746  
N (Uncensored) 1253  1253  
Base Treatment is: Group Photo-Group Text (GPGT) Condition 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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